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1 Introduction.
A major change in the health care sector worldwide is in the contractual arrange-
ments between payers and providers of care. Countries with provision of health
care organized around explicit contracts, like the U.S., moved from retrospective
to more prospective payment systems. Preferential provider arrangements have
also been introduced. Countries with a delivery of health care based on National
Health Systems seek to introduce some sort of explicit contracting. Again, the def-
inition of a contract implies specification of which organizations enter the contract.
Frech (1991) provides an overall account of the elements involved in the design
of doctors’ fees (see also Charatan (2000)). Moreover, Brooks et al. (1997) docu-
ments empirically the importance of bargaining and the evolution of the bargaining
position between an third-party payer and a hospital in the case of appendectomy
pricing.
In this paper, we address the question of how an third-party payer decides what
providers to contract with. To illustrate, we consider one third-party payer and two
providers. The provision of health care is produced at constant (zero) marginal
cost.
We analyze three different mechanisms and compare their properties. A first
mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with
both providers, jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the out-
come of the same simultaneous bargaining, but independently with every provider.
Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called “any will-
ing provider” where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider
freely decides to sign it or not.
There are other possible mechanisms of interest. Among them, we can point
out a sequential bargaining so that after the third-party payer has finished the pro-
cedure with one provider, it starts a new one with the second provider. Conducting
sequential negotiations may nevertheless increase considerably transaction costs.
The implications of sequential bargaining are left for future research.
We propose the Nash Bargaining solution as the equilibrium concept. Ex-
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tensive presentations of the non-cooperative bargaining theory are Binmore et al.
(1986), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) or Roth (1985). Also, a short introduction
is provided by Sutton (1986).
We insert this paper in a more general research project analyzing the relation-
ship between third-party payers and providers in the health care market. The in-
terest of this research line lies in the study of mechanisms combining health care
insurance contract in a differentiated product setting aiming at the control of the
expenditure in the health care sector. We can think of that relationship at the out-
come of a three-stage game. In a first stage, the third-party payer (be it a NHS
or private insurance companies) offers health insurance contracts to consumers.
Such contracts specify insurance premiums, the providers the individuals have ac-
cess to when ill, and the associated copayments. In a second stage, each insurance
company defines the set of selected providers to which the individuals that have
contracted a health insurance have access to when ill. Finally, in the third stage of
the game, providers compete in prices and qualities in the market. The competitive
process among providers is influenced by every one of them having been selected,
or not, by an insurance company to provide health care services to its population
of insured individuals.
We tackle the third stage of the game in Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2000). In
particular, the model in Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2000) studies the competitive
effects on providers from different reimbursement rules.
The present paper looks at the second stage of the game, that is, we analyze
how an insurance company decides the selection of providers to which the individ-
uals contracting a health care insurance will have access to. To make the problem
tractable, we consider one third-party payer and two providers. We also take the
perspective of an third-party payer at the beginning of its activity and has a set of
providers to choose among. The decision of the third-party payer consists in nego-
tiating the price at which to reimburse the health care services offered to patients
insured with the company. We look at this problem from three different angles.
The third-party payer may bargain the reimbursement policy (i) jointly with both
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providers; (ii) separately (but simultaneously) with each provider; or may decide
a “any willing provider” policy, that is, to announce a price at which it is willing
to reimburse the services and let the providers freely decide whether they accept
the proposal or not. Naturally, an important element of the analysis is the relative
bargaining power of the different agents involved. The question we address is what
of these procedures should a third-party payer select.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 lays down the model
structure. In section 3 we report the equilibrium solution under separate bargain-
ing, and describe the equilibrium characterization associated with “any willing
provider” contracts. Next, section 4 discusses the optimal negotiation format. Sec-
tion 5 extends the analysis to an arbitrary number of providers. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 The model.
To be precise, we assume that there is population of consumers with a potential
health problem. Each member of the population has a given probability of being
sick. We assume that the expected mass of consumers demanding health care is
1 and it is distributed uniformly on a [0; 1] horizontal differentiation line. Each
consumer demands one unit of health care in the event of illness. The horizontal
differentiation line represents the differences providers have at consumers eyes. It
can be objective, like geographic distance, or subjective, such as personal taste for
one provider over the other.1
The insurance contract defines a premium to be paid by consumers, which is
taken as given at the moment of the negotiation with providers. Total revenues
of the insurance company are exogenously given. When selecting providers, the
third-party payer has already collected the insurance premia/contributions from
consumers.
1Implicitly, we assume that there are no quality differences across providers. Otherwise, a ver-
tical differentiation dimension would have to be added to the problem. For quality issues in the
provision of health care in the context of vertical differentiation models see Jofre-Bonet (2000) and
the references therein.
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We restrict attention to the situations where the third-party payer contracts with
at least one provider. The case of not contracting with any provider means that no
insurance is, in fact, given. It cannot be an equilibrium contract of the full, three-
stage, game. We ignore it in the ensuing analysis. We also assume, for simplicity,
zero production costs in the provision of health care. Our qualitative results are
insensitive to this simplifying assumption.
We assume that consumers always take full insurance (i.e. c = 0). Even in the
presence of operating costs (recovered by insurance companies through a loading
factor) and/or not all providers being included in the insurance plan, we take the
consumer to contract full insurance. The assumption is made for simplicity and,
again, does not change the qualitative features of the model. We can see it as a re-
sult of the insurance company offering only full insurance. To justify somewhat the
assumption, we also consider that a consumer when signing the insurance contract
does not know beforehand the position (s)he will have in the horizontal differenti-
ation line when sick. The location of the consumer in the horizontal differentiation
characteristic is independent of the probability of occurrence of the illness episode.
In terms of insurance choice models, this adds a background risk to the demand
for insurance, thus reinforcing the demand for insurance (Eeckhoudt and Kimball,
1992). The population we study is made of patients and it is conceivably, a sub-
set of all people insured. In the first-stage of the game, individuals face several
possible states of the world (for example, healthy or sick). The uncertainty faced
at that stage determines health insurance demand. After realization of uncertainty,
if an individual is sick, demands health care. We focus on this second stage, and
leave the analysis of the insurance contract (and of competition) in the first-stage
for future research. The present discussion can be seen as a building block for that
more comprehensive approach.
Generically, providers may have different bargaining powers, so that the dis-
tribution of bargaining power will involve a parameter constellation for the third-
party payer and the two providers respectively. However, we are interested in com-
paring different systems of negotiation between a third-party payer and a set of
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providers. To keep focus in this issue we will assume that all providers have the
same bargaining power, so that they will be symmetric in all respects. We could
think of asymmetries in bargaining power as a way to capture differences in tech-
nology, size, quality, etc. among providers. In turn, this would imply that we would
have to allow providers to react to the differential characteristic (e.g. invest in size,
R& D, quality, etc.) introducing an additional stage in the game. It our perception
that this implied modeling would add little to the understanding of the performance
of different ways in which the negotiation process is organized.
We discuss the implications of this assumptions at the end of the paper.
3 Alternative bargaining procedures.
3.1 Separate bargaining.
By separate bargaining we refer to the situation where the third-party payer carries
negotiations simultaneously but independently with the providers. The third-party
payer has a bargaining power strength parameter given by – and each provider is
endowed with 1¡–. Note that this situation does not correspond to a process where
after failing to close a deal with one provider, the third-party payer addresses the
second one. In our scenario, the provider when accepting or rejecting a deal does
not know the outcome of the other parallel negotiation process.
Three scenarios may appear. Both providers accept the deal offered by the
third-party payer, none accepts, or only one accepts the deal. We start by introduc-
ing some notation. LetR be (exogenous) premia collected by the third-party payer.
At the moment when the third-party payer negotiates with providers, the prices of
services delivered, the premia, have already been collected. F denotes the penalty
to the third-party payer when one provider does not accept. This penalty is left
unspecified at this stage. It captures the point that an insurer giving access to a
smaller set of options in health care provision faces a cost to it (for example either
reputation or money returned to insured people). bƒ are third-party payer’s profits;
ƒi are profits to provider i when both providers accept; eƒi are profits to provider
i when it accepts while j does not accept; ƒi are profits to provider i when it does
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not accept while j accepts, and, finally, ƒi are profits to provider i when neither
provider accepts.
The revenues obtained by the third-party payer when both providers accept the
deal are given by R¡ƒA ¡ƒB . When only, say, provider A accepts the revenues
to the third-party payer are R ¡ eƒA ¡ F . Finally, if no provider accepts the deal
the third-party payer obtains zero revenues.
We deal first with the conditions to be satisfied such that both providers accept.
Given our assumption of full insurance, an equilibrium with both providers
accepting exists, given the symmetry between providers, when the same price pre-
vails for both. Hence, providers will share the market evenly and their profits will
be given by half of the respective equilibrium price.
The negotiation with provider A is described by the following problem,
max
PA
h
(R¡ƒA ¡ƒB)¡ (R¡ F ¡ eƒB)i–(ƒA ¡ƒA)(1¡–):
The fallback level of the third party payer is defined by the profits it obtains
under the agreement with the other provider, net of the penalty associated to a
smaller set of providers than the maximum possible.
Similarly, the negotiation with provider B is given by,
max
PB
h
(R¡ƒA ¡ƒB)¡ (R¡ F ¡ eƒA)i–(ƒB ¡ƒB)(1¡–)
From the symmetry of providers, eƒA = eƒB = eƒ and ƒA = ƒB = ƒ = t=8.
The first order conditions of the maximization problems yield,
Pi = 2(1¡ –)(F + eƒ¡ 12Pj) + –t4 ; i; j = A;B; i 6= j:
Solving the first order conditions and defining eR · F + eƒ we obtain the
(symmetric) prices:
eP = 2(1¡ –)
2¡ –
eR+ –t
4(2¡ –) > 0:
These (positive) prices are equilibrium prices if two additional consistency con-
ditions are met: (i) no provider wants to leave the agreement and (ii) the third-party
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payer obtains non-negative revenues. Condition (i) requires ƒ( eP ) = eP=2 ‚ ƒi =
t=8. This is satisfied iff eR > t=4. Condition (ii) is fulfilled iff R ‚ eP .
Take now the case of only one provider accepting the price determined in the
negotiation process.
Assume that provider i accepts the deal while provider j rejects it. The negoti-
ation process between the third-party payer and provider i is described by,
max
Pi
(R¡ eƒi ¡ F )–(eƒi ¡ƒi)1¡–:
The solution of this problem is given by,
Pi =
4
3
‡–t
2
+ (1¡ –)(R¡ F )
·
; Pj =
t
2
;
eƒi =–t2 + (1¡ –)(R¡ F ); ƒj = t8; and;bƒ =–‡R¡ F ¡ t
2
·
:
The pair (Pi; Pj) will constitute an equilibrium price pair if (i) providers’ prices
and third-party revenues are non-negative and (ii) provider i is not willing to quit
the agreement (i.e. eƒi ‚ ƒi) and provider j does not want to join it (i.e. ƒj ‚ ƒj).
Third-party revenues are non-negative iff R¡ F ‚ t=2. This condition is also
sufficient to ensure that Pi ‚ 0 and that provider i does not have incentives to leave
the agreement. Provider j does not want to join iff R • t=4.
Note that the latter condition is not compatible with the former, so that we
cannot have an equilibrium with only one provider accepting the negotiation with
the third-party payer under separate bargaining.
We can summarize the discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under separate bargaining, it is not possible to find an equilibrium
configuration where only one provider accepts to negotiate with the third-party
payer.
Moreover, when eR ‚ t=4 andR ‚ eP , the equilibrium price with both providers
negotiating with the third-party payer is given by eP = 2(1¡ –)
2¡ –
eR+ –t
4(2¡ –) .
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This proposition implies that one cannot have under explicit bargaining pro-
cedure with similar providers the case of one joining the agreement and the other
not. The disadvantage in terms of demand from being left out is higher than the
advantage of being a price-setter. Moreover, it is not clear that the equilibrium
price is smaller than the one prevailing on the stand-alone market (that is, without
insurance to consumers). The condition for a higher price in the separate bargain-
ing model relative to the stand-alone case is eR ‚ t=2, which is compatible with
the conditions for existence of a separate bargaining equilibrium.
3.2 Joint bargaining.
Our approach to the bargaining mechanism is non-cooperative, that is, even when
the third-party payer decides to negotiate jointly (in the same room) with both
providers, we assume that they are not able to cooperate. The analysis of coalitions
in bargaining models can be found e.g. in Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b) and Jun
(1989). Also, in this line Chae and Heidhues (1999) and Heidhues (2000) propose a
bargaining theory explaining the advantage of integration across independent mar-
kets. In a different but related approach, Calvo-Armengol (1999a,b) analyzes the
optimal selection of a bargaining partner when communication among partners is
graph-restricted, that is when the decision of who are the two parts that get together
to negotiate are determined by those individuals in the population that are in direct
contact with. A different way to proceed would be to assume that an association
bargains on behalf of its members. This however, raises several other issues. One
of them is the commitment of each provider not to negotiate individually if the ne-
gotiation made by the association does not succeed. A second issue is whether the
negotiations are done openly, that is, in a way that can be easily monitored by the
principals (providers), or behind closed doors. We do not address the delegation
issue here.2 Instead, we assume that the negotiation process, even if conducted by
an association on behalf of providers, mimics the result of simultaneous bargaining
with all providers.
2The interested reader is referred to Fingleton and Raith (2000).
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Two sets of alternative assumptions come naturally to mind regarding the dis-
tribution of bargaining power:
a) The third-party payer keeps bargaining strength – and providers share evenly
the remaining bargaining power.
b) Providers keep their bargaining strength (1¡–) and the third-party payer has
bargaining strength given by 2– ¡ 1 (also requiring – > 1=2).
In case a), the third-party payer does not lose bargaining power by conducting
a joint negotiation compared to the separate bargaining case. In some sense, con-
ducting a joint bargaining procedure is a way to make the providers weaker. On
the other hand, in case b), the third-party payer loses bargaining power in joint
bargaining with respect to the separate bargaining. These two cases are sufficient
to show that either negotiation process can be preferred by the third-party payer ,
depending on how much bargaining power the third-party payer retains relative to
the providers.
3.2.1 Constant third-party payer’s bargaining power.
Consider that when bargaining jointly the third-party payer retains its bargaining
power. The problem to solve is:
max
PA;PB
‡
(R¡ƒA ¡ƒB)¡ (R¡ F ¡ eƒ)·– ¡ƒA ¡ „ƒA¢ 1¡–2 ¡ƒB ¡ „ƒB¢ 1¡–2
where eƒ represents the payment to provider i assuming that in case of breakdown
of one negotiation, the third-party payer maintains the negotiation with the other
provider. Since we are assuming identical providers, eƒ is independent of the se-
lected provider to negotiate with. To complete the reading of the maximization
program, note that „ƒi = t=8.
The solution of the maximization program yields a symmetric (candidate) equi-
librium price, eP = (1¡ –) eR+ –t
4
> 0:
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This equilibrium price has to be consistent with (i) the non-negativity of the
third-party payer revenues (bƒ = R¡ eP ‚ 0) and (ii) the incentives of the providers
to stay in the agreement (ƒi ‚ „ƒi , eR ‚ t=4). This last condition essentially
requires a positive surplus to be shared once the fallback levels have been taken
into account (R¡ (R¡ eƒ¡ F )¡ t=8¡ t=8 > 0).
3.2.2 Constant bargaining power of providers.
Consider now a joint bargaining procedure where providers to retain their bargain-
ing power vis-a-vis the third-party payer. The joint bargaining solution solves:
max
PA;PB
‡
(R¡ƒA ¡ƒB)¡ (R¡ F ¡ eƒ)·2–¡1 ¡ƒA ¡ „ƒA¢1¡– ¡ƒB ¡ „ƒB¢1¡– ;
where eƒ = (1 ¡ –)(R ¡ F ) + –t=2 has the same interpretation as before and
naturally, „ƒi = t=8.
The equilibrium price (identical for both providers) is:
eP = 2(1¡ –) eR+ (2– ¡ 1)t
4
> 0;
where the positivity of the price comes from the fact that the bargaining power of
the third-party payer (2– ¡ 1) has to be strictly positive. Substituting the value ofeƒ we obtain,
eP = µ2– ¡ 1
4
+ –(1¡ –)
¶
t+ 2(1¡ –)2R+ 2–(1¡ –)F
As usual, this equilibrium price has to be consistent with (i) the non-negativity of
the third-party payer revenues (i.e. bƒ = R ¡ eP ‚ 0) and (ii) the incentives of the
providers to stay in the agreement (i.e. ƒi ‚ „ƒi , eR ‚ t=4). Taking both cases
together, the following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. Under joint bargaining, the two providers will stay in the agree-
ment if eR ‚ t=4 andR ‚ eP , both when the third-party payer keeps the bargaining
power and when the providers retain the bargaining power. No configuration with
a single provider appears in equilibrium.
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The last part of the proposition follows from the fact that one provider leav-
ing the agreement and the other staying in takes the analysis back to the separate
bargaining case with only one provider accepting the agreement.
3.3 “Any willing provider” contracts.
A different way of contracting health care services is frequently used by Govern-
ments and, to some extent, by private health plans or insurance companies: the
payer announces a price, and providers decide, on a volunteer basis, to join (or not)
the agreement. This is known as “any willing provider” contracts. Simon (1995)
studies both the characteristics of the states that have enacted AWP laws and their
effect on managed care penetration rates and provider participation. Also, Obsfeldt
et al. (1998) explore the growth of AWP laws applicable to managed care firms and
the determinants of their enactment.
Within this framework, providers may be, or not, allowed to balance bill pa-
tients, that is, they may charge, or not, an amount to consumers on top of the price
received by the third-party payer. Balance billing has received some attention in
the literature. Glazer and McGuire (1993) study the efficiency effects of physician
fees under balance billing and compare the equilibria of monopolistically competi-
tive physicians with and without balance billing. Finally, Zuckerman and Holahan
(1991) analyze the effects of balance billing on the reform of physician payment.
(See also comments by Hixson (1991)). Since balance billing in not crucial to our
arguments, we assume it away. This assumption is also supported by its prohibition
in several countries.
In a world of two providers, the set of possible decisions defines four differ-
ent sub-games in prices, which in turn define previous-stage profits for providers.
Therefore, we first characterize the four subgames. When both providers choose
to join agreement, demand is split in half. Each provider receives price p. Profits
earned are ƒi = p=2; i = A;B. In the other polar case of both providers choosing
not to join the agreement, the market game is back to the Hotelling price game,
given fixed locations. The symmetry of the solution implies equal demand to each
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provider and prices are, in equilibrium, pi = t; i = A;B. Associated equilibrium
profits are ƒi = t=2; i = A;B.
The last possible case has one provider joining the agreement and accepting
to receive p, while the other stays out and sets freely its price. Without loss of
generality, we assume provider A to join the agreement. Demand is defined by the
location of the indifferent consumer, which is given by:
tx = pB + t(1¡ x) or x = 12 +
pB
2t
:
Since providers are not allowed to balance bill patients, someone visiting provider
A pays nothing while if he visits provider B pays the full price charged by the lat-
ter provider. The equilibrium price of provider B is pB = t=2 and profits are
ƒB = t=8 and ƒA = 3p=4.
The payoff matrix of the first-stage of the subgame is now given by Table 1.
A/B Join Not Join
Join p/2 ; p/2 3p/4 ; t/8
Not Join t/8 ; 3p/4 t/2 ; t/2
Table 1: Equilibrium profits.
For the outcome of both joining to be an equilibrium, it is necessary and suffi-
cient that
p
2
‚ t
8
or
p
t
‚ 1
4
:
On the other hand, for both providers to stay out of the agreement, we need
to have p=t < 2=3. It is straightforward to check that there is no asymmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies. The different possibilities can be traced in the (p; t)
space as shown in Figure 1.
It is clear that there is a range of parameter values for which both equilibria
may arise. We use Pareto dominance as selection criterion, which ensures that
only one equilibrium is selected. Thus, the equilibrium where both providers join
the agreement occurs for p=t ‚ 2=3, as in the intermediate range it is dominated
by the other equilibrium candidate.
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tFigure 1: Equilibrium regimes.
Taking into account that the negotiation discussion we present in this paper is
a subgame of a broader game, it is easy to recognize that in the equilibrium of that
broader game we cannot have both providers not participating in the “any willing
provider” contract. If this was the case, not insurance will be in fact delivered to
consumers, and in anticipation of this, no insurance contract would be signed. This
provides a clear rationale to impose in the remaining of our analysis that p=t ‚ 2=3.
We take now the optimal choice of the price set by the third-party payer. The
criterion is the minimization of total health expenditure. Given the initial assump-
tion of full insurance, all expenses will be paid, irrespective of the provider chosen
by each particular consumer. The optimal value of p to be announced in the “any
willing provider” contract is the lower price that still allows for both providers ac-
cepting it. Thus, the optimal price is p=t = 2=3. This optimal price is also lower
than t, which guarantees that the third-party payer prefers to announce “any willing
provider” contracts instead of allowing free competition between the parties.
Three negotiation formats have been presented up to this point: separate bar-
gaining, joint bargaining and any willing provider. It is now time to address the
relative advantages of each negotiation process vis-a-vis the others.
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4 The preferred negotiation format.
4.1 Joint vs. separate bargaining.
We can trace the comparison of joint and separate bargaining procedures in the
space (P; ~R), where ~R · eƒ + F . Again, distinguishing between two different
assumptions is of relevance.
Consider first the case where the third-party payer retains its bargaining power
in the joint bargaining with respect to the separate bargaining. From the point
of view of the third-party payer the joint bargaining is better than the separate
bargaining. This is easily seen by taking the difference between profits:
bƒJB ¡ bƒSB = –(1¡ –)2¡ –
µeR¡ t
4
¶
‚ 0:
This difference is non-negative from the equilibrium condition for joint bargaining
to yield an equilibrium surplus division.
Consider now the case where providers keep their bargaining powers. The
difference in profits for the third-party payer is,
bƒJB ¡ bƒSB = µ t4 ¡ eR
¶
2(1¡ –)2
2¡ – • 0:
This difference is non-positive again from the equilibrium condition for joint bar-
gaining to yield an equilibrium surplus division. Thus, comparison of joint bar-
gaining vs. separate bargaining hinges upon how the bargaining power of the
third-party payer changes, relative to providers.
4.2 Joint bargaining, Separate bargaining and Any willing provider.
The comparison between a joint bargaining process and its alternatives (separate
bargaining and “any willing provider” contracts) depends on who retains more
easily the bargaining power when moving from separate to joint bargaining.
Consider first the case where the joint bargaining is better than the separate
bargaining, (i.e. when the third-party payer keeps the bargaining power). From
the point of view of the third-party payer, the joint bargaining procedure is better
15
R~
P~
2t/3
JB
SB
AWP dominates
   JB and SB
AWP dominates SB
than “any willing provider” if
bƒJB ¡ bƒAWP = p¡ eP = p¡ ‡– t4 + ~R(1¡ –)· > 0:
Similarly, the separate bargaining procedure, in the case it dominates joint bar-
gaining (i.e. when providers keep their bargaining power), can be compared with
the “any willing provider” procedure according to:
bƒSB ¡ bƒAWP = p¡ ‡ –t4(2¡ –) + ~R2(1¡ –)2¡ – · > 0:
These two conditions define two lines, as shown in Figure 2, which allow for a
simple description of the basic economic intuition present.
Figure 2: Optimal negotiation procedure.
Consider the case of joint bargaining. At the optimal price p=t = 2=3, we
observe that for high values of eR, the any willing provider contract is preferred
while for low values the ordering is reversed. This results from relatively simple
forces. The intuition runs as follows. If eR is small, there is not much surplus to
bargain. Hence, prices will be below the price required in the any willing provider
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case to generate the acceptance outcome. The reverse occurs for high eR. Since the
bargaining process transfers surplus, the any willing provider contract is equivalent
to a “tough” bargaining position. The commitment to a price is more valuable wheneR is large.
It is easy to see that the same intuition applies to the comparison between sep-
arate bargaining and “any willing provider”. More interesting is to note that the
“any willing provider” contract dominates for a wider set of parameters in the case
of separate bargaining. This is not surprising, as the separate bargaining proce-
dure performs better, from the point of view of the third-party payer, than joint
bargaining when putting the providers together makes the third-party payer less
powerful. If this occurs, the “any willing provider” type of contract is a way to
regain bargaining power.
5 A “pyramid” model.
In our two-provider world, it is never the case that one provider decides to join ne-
gotiations with the third-party payer, while the other provider remains outside any
agreement. One may question whether this a general feature, or not. In particular,
we want to address whether this is a matter of a small number of providers, or not.
We are able to show that, in an extended model, there is no subset of providers
which choose, in equilibrium, to remain independent. By independent we mean
providers that do not negotiate prices with the third-party payer.
We consider a natural extension of our two-provider model: there are n providers
in the market, each pair of providers is connected by a segment of length one of
consumers (that is, total market size is z = n(n ¡ 1)=2.3 Thus, every provider
competes with every other one.
Since we are looking for an asymmetric equilibrium emerging from a symmet-
ric starting point, two demand functions are crucial: the one faced by providers
that decided to remain outside any negotiation (outsiders) and the demand faced
3We can, alternatively, fix market size at one. In this case, each segment linking any two providers
has length 1/z. It turns out that equilibrium conditions are exactly the same. For other applications
of the pyramid model, see von Ungern-Stenberg (1991).
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by providers that bargain with the third-party provider (insiders). Without loss of
generality, we index insiders from 1 to n, and outsiders from n+ 1 to n.
The demand faced by outsiders is:
Douti =
nX
j=n+1;j 6=i
µ
1
2
¡ Pi ¡ Pj
2t
¶
+
nX
j=1
µ
1
2
¡ Pi
2t
¶
:
The total demand is composed by the usual Hotelling demand when the out-
sider provider faces another outsider plus the demand under zero price of the rival
in the consumers’ range it is competing with insiders.
Similarly, the insiders demand is:
Dini =
nX
j=n+1
µ
1
2
+
Pj
2t
¶
+
nX
j=1;j 6=i
1
2
:
The first term is demand shared with outsiders, while the second term is the
equal split of demand with other insiders. Let’s take first the problem of outside
providers. The profit function is:
ƒouti = piD
out
i :
The first-order condition for profit maximization is:
@ƒouti
@pi
=
nX
j=n+1;j 6=i
µ
1
2
¡ Pi
2t
¶
+
nX
j=1
µ
1
2
¡ Pi
2t
¶
¡ n¡ 1
2t
Pi = 0:
The resulting equilibrium price of outsiders (which does not depend on insid-
ers’ prices given the full insurance assumption) is:
P =
n¡ 1
n+ n¡ 1 t:
The profit of an outsider provider, when there are n providers in the market and
n of them choose to negotiate with third-party payers is:
ƒout(n) =
t
2
(n¡ 1)3
(n+ n¡ 1)2 :
We need now to characterize the negotiation process with the n inside providers.
We assume, for the moment, that the third-party payer conducts a joint bargaining
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process. The optimal negotiated prices solve:
max
fpig
( eR¡ nX
i=1
ƒi)–
nY
i=1
¡
ƒi ¡ƒout(n)
¢(1¡–)=n
;
where eR denotes the revenues from the insurer net of its fallback value.
The associated first-order condition is:
¡–(ƒi ¡ƒout(n¡ 1)) + ( eR¡ nX
i=1
ƒi)
1¡ –
n
= 0; i = 1; : : : ; n:
Summing over all i,
¡–
nX
i=1
ƒi + –
nX
i=1
ƒout(n¡ 1) + (1¡ –)( eR¡ nX
i=1
ƒi) = 0;
from which
nX
i=1
ƒi = (1¡ –) eR+ –nƒout(n¡ 1):
Substituting back in provider i’s first-order condition:
ƒi = ƒout(n¡ 1) + (1¡ –)ƒout(n) + eR1¡ –
n
:
Thus,
ƒini (n) = ƒ
out(n¡ 1) + 1¡ –
n
eR¡ (1¡ –)ƒout(n¡ 1) = –ƒout(n¡ 1) + 1¡ –
n
eR:
For an equilibrium with non-empty sets of both insiders and outsiders, one need
to have,
ƒin(n) ‚ ƒout(n¡ 1); and
ƒout(n) ‚ ƒin(n+ 1):
That is, neither insiders nor outsiders want to change their decisions. The first
condition can be rewritten as,
eR
n
¡ƒout(n) ‚ 0; or eR ‚ n(n¡ 1)3t
2(n+ n¡ 1)2 ;
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while the second condition can be simplified to,eR
n
¡ƒout(n) • 0; or eR • (n+ 1)(n¡ 1)3t
2(n+ n)2
:
Define,
K(x) =
n+ x
(n+ n+ x¡ 1)2 :
For the above conditions to define a proper interval for R, it is required that
K(0) < K(1). It is straightforward to check that @K
@x
< 0, which means that no
equilibrium with non-empty sets of both insiders and outsiders exist. Hence, the
only equilibrium configurations are either all providers as insiders or all providers
as outsiders.
To obtain an all-inclusive equilibrium, the equilibrium profits of each provider
must be greater than the profits of being the first outsider, and the surplus for the
third-party payer must be positive.
The profit of the first outsider is given by,
ƒout(n¡ 1) = t
8
(n¡ 1):
According to the conditions mentioned above, ƒin(n) ‚ ƒout(n¡ 1) requires
eR ‚ t
8
(n¡ 1)n: (1)
The equilibrium price obtained after solving the first-order condition of the
problem describing the negotiation process yields,
P = –
t
4
+ (1¡ –) 2
eR
n(n¡ 1) :
The third-party payer obtains a non-negative surplus if eR ¡ nƒin(n) ‚ 0,
which boils down to the condition (1) above. Thus, if condition (1) is met, all
providers are insiders.
We summarize our discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under joint bargaining, the equilibrium has all providers accept-
ing the agreement iff eR ‚ t
4
n(n¡ 1)
2
:
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The associated equilibrium price is,
P = –
t
4
+ (1¡ –) 2
eR
n(n¡ 1) :
This proposition extends naturally our previous result (note that for n = 2, we
recover the conditions in the previous section).
We now proceed to derive implications of the use of “any willing provider
contracts” in the ”pyramid” model. The crucial conditions to be satisfied to reach
an equilibrium with a partition of providers into those associated with the third-
party payer and independent providers are,
ƒin(n) ‚ ƒout(n¡ 1); and
ƒout(n) ‚ ƒin(n+ 1):
Assuming that balance billing is not allowed, the relevant profit functions are:
ƒin(n) =
p(n¡ 1)
2
+ (n¡ n)p3
4
;
ƒout(n) =
nt
8
+ (n¡ n¡ 1) t
2
:
Defining ~p = p=t, is is straightforward to write the above conditions as:
n(3¡ 2~p) ‚ ~p(4¡ 6n) + (4n¡ 1); and
n(2~p¡ 3) ‚ (n¡ 1)(6~p¡ 4):
These conditions lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium has all providers choosing either to accept the
“any willing provider” contract proposed or to reject it. More precisely,
for ~p ‚ 2=3; all accept
for ~p < 2=3; all reject:
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Proof. The conditions to be satisfied can be expressed in terms of two basic mag-
nitudes:
n⁄ =
(n¡ 1)(6~p¡ 4)
2~p¡ 3 ;
n⁄⁄ =
1¡ 4~p+ n(6~p¡ 4)
2~p¡ 3 :
The first point to note is that ¢n = n⁄⁄ ¡ n⁄ = 1: Thus, there is only one
integer value n between n⁄ and n⁄⁄. We now show that it is not possible to have
some providers choosing to be in the agreement and the remaining ones choosing
to be independent, that is, we cannot have a mixed equilibrium.
Take first 2~p¡ 3 ‚ 0. The conditions for a mixed equilibrium are n • n⁄⁄ and
n ‚ n⁄. It must also be the case that n⁄⁄ > 0 and n⁄ < n for feasibility of the
solution.
For n < n to be satisfied,
(n¡ 1)(6~p¡ 4) < n(2~p¡ 3);
or
n <
6~p¡ 4
4~p¡ 1 · "(~p):
As @"=@~p > 0 and arg min~p "(~p) = 3=2; n < "(3=2) is a necessary condi-
tion. This implies n < 1, which is not feasible. Hence, we cannot have a mixed
equilibrium for ~p > 3=2.
Take now 2~p < 3. The conditions to be satisfied for a mixed equilibrium are
n ‚ n⁄⁄; n • n⁄. Since n⁄⁄ = n⁄ + 1, this is not a well-defined interval. No
equilibrium value for n exists.
We show next under what conditions all providers either accept or reject the
proposed “any willing provider” contract.
The condition for all providers to accept is given by:
ƒin(n) ‚ ƒout(n¡ 1);
or
p
n¡ 1
2
+ (n¡ n)3
4
‚ (n¡ 1) t
8
+ (n¡ n+ 1¡ 1) t
2
;
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which becomes ~p ‚ 1=4. Thus, for prices above this threshold all providers accept
the “any willing provider” contract.
The condition for all providers to reject the contract proposal is,
ƒout(0) ‚ ƒin(1);
or
~p • 2=3:
Now, for 2=3 ‚ p ‚ 1=4 both equilibria are possible. As in the two-provider
case, we appeal to the concept of Pareto dominance to select one of the two possi-
bilities.
Equilibrium profits when all providers accept the contract are,
ƒ = (n¡ 1)p
2
:
On the other hand, when all providers stay out, the equilibrium profits are,
ƒ = (n¡ 1) t
2
:
It is straightforward to see that for ~p • 2=3, profits of not accepting are always
higher.
Summarising, the equilibrium characterisation, under the criterion of Pareto
dominance, is
– all providers accept the contract, n = n for ~p ‚ 2=3;
– all providers reject the contract, n = 0 for ~p < 2=3.
The equilibrium price to be set by the third-party payer is ~p = 2=3. Higher
prices do not increase the set of providers, but it means higher payments. Lower
prices lead to exit of all providers.
This proposition shows that, under the “any willing provider” contract, either
all providers join the network or none does. There exists a threshold price above
which all providers accept the contract proposed by the third-party payer.
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We cannot make a direct comparison with joint bargaining outcome, since the
equilibrium price in the latter negotiation process is not explicitly determined in
our analysis. The equilibrium price depends on the objective function of the third-
party payer. In particular, it will depend on the penalties suffered by the third-party
payer whenever a provider does not join the agreement. These can include both
monetary and non-monetary aspects (like reputation, value of variety and freedom
of choice to consumers, etc : : : ).
A final question to be addressed is whether the increase in the number of
providers does change the relative attractiveness of joint bargaining vs. any willing
provider contracts. The crucial comparison to be made is between,
P = –
t
4
+ (1¡ –) eR 2
n(n¡ 1)
and
P =
2t
3
:
Defining the comparison in per capita terms, noting that n(n ¡ 1)=2 is the
total number of consumers served, we see that if the reference value eR adjusts
exactly such as to keep the per capita value constant, then increasing the number
of providers does not change the relative attractiveness of any willing provider
contracts vis-a-vis joint bargaining.
This will be the case if when losing one provider the third-party payer receives
zero surplus. Then eR equals premium revenues. Since consumers are ex-ante
identical (an implicit assumption in our model), the premia revenue are just a fixed
premia times the number of consumers.
However, a zero surplus when just one provider defects from the agreement
may seem to extreme. Another possible assumption is to take a fixed penalty F
for each provider that leaves the negotiation, independent of the total number of
providers and of how many providers still remain in the agreement. In this case,
we can provide some further structure to the problem. The reference value eR is
defined by eR = F + (n¡ 1)ƒin(n¡ 1);
24
and
ƒin(n¡ 1) = ƒout(n¡ 2)– + (1¡ –)
eR
n¡ 1 ;
ƒout(n¡ 2) = t
2
(n¡ 1)3
(2n¡ 3)2 :
Solving for the equilibrium value of eR, holding F constant, we obtain
eR = F
–
+
t(n¡ 1)4
2(2n¡ 3)2 :
Substituting back into the per capita spending (equilibrium price) in the joint
bargaining situation,
P = –
t
4
+
1¡ –
–
F + (1¡ –)tQ(n);
where
Q(n) =
(n¡ 1)3
n(2n¡ 3)2 ;
and
@Q
@n
= ¡ 3(n¡ 1)
2
n2(2n¡ 3)3 < 0:
Thus, an increase in the total number of providers leads, in this case, to being
less likely for any willing provider contracts to dominate. This is so because the
equilibrium price will be lower the higher the number of providers. In terms of
Figure 2, this means that the line JB rotates downwards around its intercept with
the ep axis. Moreover, the equilibrium price under joint bargaining is,
lim
n!1
P =
t
4
+
1¡ –
–
F;
which can be smaller or greater than 2t=3 depending on the penalty F . Thus,
in general, the intuition of the two-provider case caries over to any number of
providers.
6 Final remarks.
In this paper, we address a simple question: what negotiation procedure should a
third-party payer select when contracting health care providers? Three alternatives,
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commonly observed, have been considered assuming a simultaneous negotiation:
separate bargaining, joint bargaining and “any willing provider” contracts.
In separate bargaining, the third-party payer negotiates with each provider in
an independent way; joint bargaining means that a simultaneous bargaining with
all providers is implemented; finally, the “any willing provider” procedure consists
in a price announcement by the third-party payer . Providers willing to take such
price are free to join the contract. The assumption of a simultaneous negotiation
process is justified by the transaction costs associated with the negotiations. If such
transaction costs are of a fixed nature (that is, they do not depend on the particu-
lar outcome of each negotiation and are independent of the particular procedure
selected), than a simultaneous bargaining approach will be preferred. Sequential
bargaining procedures can, on the other hand, offer some advantages due to the
strategic elements involved. A full exploration of benefits and costs of sequential
bargaining approaches is left for future research.
The main findings of the analysis are the following. Superiority of a joint bar-
gaining procedure relative to an independent bargaining approach hinges upon how
bargaining power is distributed. This accords with intuition. More interesting is the
comparison of either joint or separate bargaining approaches with the “any willing
provider” contracts. Whenever the surplus to be shared in the bargaining is rela-
tively high, the third-party payer prefers the “any willing provider” system. This
is so because the simple price announcement constitutes an implicit commitment
to be tough. This commitment is more valuable in the case of a bigger surplus. It
is also possible to state that the “any willing provider” contract dominates more
easily the separate bargaining procedure than the joint bargaining approach (un-
der the assumption that the third-party payer keeps the bargaining power in both
situations). The reason is that under joint bargaining, the grouping of providers
makes the third-party payer relatively stronger when compared with individual
negotiations with each provider. Therefore, the third-party payer is able to ex-
tract a higher share of the surplus and the commitment value of the “any willing
provider” contract is less important.
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Although most of the analysis has been done considering two providers only,
we can extend the same arguments to an arbitrary number of providers. Moreover,
under the symmetry assumptions used, the possible equilibria with an arbitrary
number of providers are characterized either all providers joining the agreement
with the third-party payer, or none accepting the proposal of the third-party payer.
Some caveats to the model deserve discussion. The first one is the symmetry
across providers. We conjecture that introducing asymmetries across providers, be
it in the bargaining power vis-a-vis the third-party payer , or in the production
costs of health care services, will not change the qualitative results, especially if
price discrimination by the third-party payer across providers is not feasible. This
seems to be, in general, the case. Payments to providers can differ according to
patient characteristics but not according to providers’ efficiency level. Of course,
some exceptions exist (for example, high reputation doctors may be able to obtain
a better value for consultation).
Second, we conjecture that the introduction of asymmetries would allow us to
obtain equilibria characterized by some providers being associated with the third-
party payer , while others remain independent. Once again, we believe the relative
advantages and costs of the different bargaining procedures to still be present.
The third issue is quality. We have assumed away quality considerations. Thus,
our analysis applies to the provision of services where quality can be easily moni-
tored, or does not have a major impact on patients’ selection of provider. Again, we
conjecture that the essential trade-off in choosing between “any willing provider”
contracts or an explicit bargaining procedure would remain. Quality differences
shift demand towards one of the providers, it would not change the incentives of
the third-party payer to choose one of the bargaining procedures proposed.
The analysis renders some testable predictions. The simplest one to put to test
is that whenever a high surplus to be shared exists, one should be observe more
frequently “any willing provider” contracts. Another one is that the number of
providers should not have an impact on the selection of the bargaining procedure
as long as the surplus per patient treated is kept constant. If the per capita surplus
27
grows (decreases) with the number of providers in the market, then one should
observe “any willing provider” more (less) often. It is beyond the scope of the
paper to empirically test these implications. This is left for future research.
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